The lessons of Invergordon by Simpson, David
Strathprints Institutional Repository
Simpson, David (1982) The lessons of Invergordon. Quarterly Economic 
Commentary, 7 (3). pp. 25-26. ISSN 0306-7866 , 
This version is available at http://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/51105/
Strathprints is  designed  to  allow  users  to  access  the  research  output  of  the  University  of 
Strathclyde. Unless otherwise explicitly stated on the manuscript, Copyright © and Moral Rights 
for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. 
Please check the manuscript for details of any other licences that may have been applied. You 
may  not  engage  in  further  distribution  of  the  material  for  any  profitmaking  activities  or  any 
commercial gain. You may freely distribute both the url (http://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/) and the 
content of this paper for research or private study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without 
prior permission or charge. 
Any  correspondence  concerning  this  service  should  be  sent  to  Strathprints  administrator: 
strathprints@strath.ac.uk
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 
THE LESSONS OF INVERGORDON 
BY DAVID SIMPSOM 
In recent months, public attention has been drawn to a number of spectacular 
plant closures, including the BSC plant at Glengarnock, Singer Clydebank, 
Talbot Linwood, Massey-Ferguson Kilmarnock, Wiggins Teape Fort William, and 
now the British Aluminium smelter at Invergordon. All have in common the 
fact that the plants concerned dominated their local labour market, so that, 
when closure came, there were few alternative employment opportunities to 
which those made redundant could turn. The local vulnerability 
thereby created should be contrasted with the employment situation in the 
new town of Milton Keynes. There, the workforce is dispersed in small and 
medium-sized plants over a wide range of industries, so that when changes in 
market conditions, resource availability or technology affects one industry, 
not all hope of employment disappears at once. For those employed at 
Invergordon, however, the expectations of secure employment, falsely 
aroused, have been doubly disappointed. 
The smelter at Invergordon has additional features in common with the motor 
vehicle assembly plant at Linwood. Both were capital-intensive - not a 
great many jobs for the capital required, and not many skilled jobs either. 
Thus, the benefits of the huge subsidies involved, (the exact amounts remain 
undisclosed) accrued not to the local population, but to the owners of the 
plant and the suppliers of the equipment. These subsidies were necessary 
since the plants were never viable from the start. Their establishment and 
location was dictated by political, and not by economic considerations. 
Since in the modern world, change is continuing, closure of such uneconomic 
plants was only a matter of time. 
The public capital which has been spent on these projects could have been 
used to provide real jobs in viable enterprises. Instead, it has been 
wasted - like throwing seedcorn on stony ground. It is frequently argued, 
however, that 'political' jobs are better than no jobs at all, since no real 
job opportunities exist. This argument is fallacious. The progress of 
technology is creating real job opportunities all the time - indeed the rate 
of progress is accelerating. Access to the latest technology is available 
to any business in Scotland - or anywhere in the Western world - through 
licensing agreements, such as those upon which, for example, the operations 
of John Brown Engineering of Clydebank are founded. And if there is a 
notable lack of businessmen willing to undertake such ventures then surely 
it is to this area that policy should be directed. 
If private enterprise is unwilling or unable to realise to a sufficient 
extent the opportunities which exist - even in the midst of the present 
recession - then one evident solution is the establishment of public 
enterprises. These are not to be confused with public monopolies such as 
the nationalised industries. On the contrary, they would operate in an 
entirely competitive environment along normal commercial lines. The 
difference is that government, whether national or local, would take the 
responsibility for finding the entrepreneur or entrepreneurs to run the 
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e n t e r p r i s e s , would p r o v i d e most of t he c a p i t a l , and would r e t a i n a 
c o n t r o l l i n g i n t e r e s t . 
Such a s o l u t i o n to t he problem of unemployment would appear to be anathema 
to the p resen t government. I t would a l so appear to have been r e s i s t e d by 
t h e c i v i l s e r v i c e , who a r e unaccus tomed t o i n t e r v e n t i o n in t h e p r o c e s s of 
economic development, in the manner of the c i v i l s e r v i c e s of, say, France or 
J apan . On t h e who le , t he B r i t i s h c i v i l s e r v i c e r e m a i n s p r e o c c u p i e d w i t h 
the theology of monetary and f i s c a l ' f i n e - t u n i n g ' , so far as economic pol icy 
i s c o n c e r n e d . But so long as t h e p o p u l a t i o n i s w i l l i n g t o a c c e p t 
p o l i t i c a l s h o w p i e c e s such as Linwood and Inve rgo rdon as an 
a l t e r n a t i v e to r e a l economic development, then our presen t economic problems 
are l i k e l y to con t inue . 
Linwood and I n v e r g o r d o n a r e not t he only ' p o l i t i c a l ' p r o j e c t s . The s t e e l 
s t r i p m i l l was e s t a b l i s h e d a t R a v e n s c r a i g on e q u a l l y p o l i t i c a l g r o u n d s . 
I t , t o o , seems u n l i k e l y to s u r v i v e much l o n g e r . At T o r n e s s , in Eas t 
Lothian, another such p r o j e c t i s under c o n s t r u c t i o n . The c a p i t a l cos t of 
t h i s nuc lear power s t a t i o n w i l l be approximately £1,000m, and w i l l provide 
some 200 j o b s . I t w i l l a l so provide e l e c t r i c i t y for which t he r e i s l i t t l e 
fo reseeab le demand. The l e s sons of Linwood and Invergordon do not seem to 
have been l e a r n e d . 
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